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INTRODUCTION
A police officer comes to your house, knocks on your door,
and presents you with a search warrant. The warrant authorizes the
officer to search your house for any evidence of illegal drug activity.
This includes any physical evidence, such as drugs, pipes, syringes,
cash, or storage containers, as well as any computers that may store
incriminating digital files. 1 During the search, the officer discovers a
substantial amount of marijuana, baggies, a scale, and other drug
paraphernalia. 2 The officer also seizes your laptop and takes it back to
the police station so its contents can be examined. 3
The following week, a police detective begins to search the
laptop. First, he makes an exact copy of your hard drive to prevent any
files from being destroyed. 4 Next, the detective uses a sophisticated
software program that organizes every file on your laptop and creates
a directory, which he proceeds to examine. 5 After opening dozens of

* J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 2009).
2
See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999).
3
See id.
4
See Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1083–84.
5
See United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 781 (7th Cir. 2010).
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innocent files, the officer opens a folder that contains hundreds of JPG
image files. 6 He opens the first file that reveals a picture of a young
boy, naked and posing for the camera. 7 The officer makes a notation,
but moves forward with his original search for drug-related activity. 8
His subsequent search reveals more photos of child pornography, as
well as other incriminating drug-related files. The police then arrest
you and charge you for both the sale of marijuana and possession of
child pornography.
This factual scenario is very similar to a number of cases
playing out in the federal circuits involving the inadvertent discovery
of illegal files that are outside the scope of the warrant during a
computer search. 9 Defendants typically challenge the admissibility of
this type of evidence in a motion to suppress arguing that the search
and seizure was beyond the scope of the original warrant. 10 On the
other hand, prosecutors and law enforcement argue that this type of
evidence is admissible because it falls under the plain view doctrine. 11
Courts have wrestled over whether inadvertently discovered
computer files are properly admissible under the plain view doctrine,
or whether they are inadmissible because the search and seizure was
beyond the scope of the original warrant. 12 A majority of federal
circuits, including the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Mann, 13
have extended traditional Fourth Amendment warrant doctrine to the
realm of digital evidence. 14 These courts base their analyses on three
6

See United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 527 (E.D. Va. 1999).
See id.
8
See Mann, 592 F.3d at 781.
9
See United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 514 (4th Cir. 2010); Mann, 592
F.3d at 782; United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1999); Gray, 78
F. Supp. 2d at 528.
10
See id.
11
See Williams, 592 F.3d at 519; Mann, 592 F.3d at 782.
12
See Williams, 592 F.3d at 514; Mann, 592 F.3d at 782; Carey, 172 F.3d at
1271; Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
13
592 F.3d at 786.
14
See generally Williams, 592 F.3d 511; United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d
1078 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Miranda, 325 F. App’x. 858 (11th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Henson, 848
F.2d 1374 (6th Cir. 1988).
7
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foundations of Fourth Amendment doctrine: reasonableness, the
particularity requirement, and the plain view doctrine. 15
In contrast, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits question whether
traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine sufficiently protects privacy
rights in the digital age. 16 In response, both Circuits have deviated
from traditional Fourth Amendment principles.17 The Ninth Circuit
has advocated a multi-step prophylactic approach in order to prevent
overbroad searches, and the Tenth Circuit determines whether the
search has exceeded the scope of the warrant by looking at the
subjective intent of the executing officer.18
Both of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ deviations are premature
and create just as many issues as they solve. They are premature
because traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine has proved to be
workable in digital evidence cases. Over time, the contours of Fourth
Amendment doctrine will evolve along with developments in
computer technology. The divergence is also impractical because it
would act as a constitutional straitjacket on law enforcement working
the field and would create two systems of search and seizure law—one
for physical evidence and one for digital evidence. These two
approaches are unnecessary because traditional Fourth Amendment
doctrine provides sufficient constitutional protection to individuals and
will evolve as technology develops or possible constitutional
intrusions later arise.
I. FRAMING THE ISSUE: TRADITIONAL FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
In order to fully understand the issue before the Seventh
Circuit in United States v. Mann, it is important to understand

15

See id.
See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1006–
07 (9th Cir. 2009); Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273–76.
17
See id.
18
See id.
16
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traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine. The starting point for this
analysis is the language of the Fourth Amendment itself, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. 19
Since the text clearly indicates that individuals are protected from any
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” 20 the Supreme Court has held
that reasonableness is the touchstone of any Fourth Amendment
analysis. 21 Drawing a clear line between a reasonable and
unreasonable search is difficult; therefore, courts must examine and
balance the totality of the circumstances. 22 A search’s reasonableness
“is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.” 23 For example, in Polston v. State, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas upheld a state statute that subjected convicted felons to
mandatory DNA testing. 24 The court held that the statute was
reasonable because the felons’ privacy interests were outweighed by
both the state’s interest in having an accurate criminal justice system
and an interest in preventing and solving future crimes. 25
19

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id.
21
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
22
United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003) (holding that the Court has
“treated reasonableness as a function of the facts of cases so various that no template
is likely to produce sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances in a
given case”).
23
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
24
201 S.W.3d 406, 407–08 (Ark. 2005).
25
Id. at 410–11 (“As to the felon’s expectation of privacy, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that ‘those who have suffered a lawful conviction’
20
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A. General Searches are Unreasonable
General searches are per se unreasonable. 26 The Fourth
Amendment aims to protect individual privacy rights by preventing
law enforcement from conducting general searches that result in a
rummaging through an individual’s property until something
incriminating is found. 27 In order to prevent general searches, the
Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant from a
judge before conducting a search. 28 A judge may issue a warrant only
when there is probable cause to believe that what the police are
looking for will be in the place to be searched. 29
B. The Particularity Requirement
A warrant may be issued once probable cause has been
established. 30 However, the warrant must “particularly describe the
things to be seized” so that “nothing is left to the discretion of the
officer executing the warrant.” 31 This particularity requirement
ensures that the search will be narrowly tailored and “will not take on
the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers
intended to prohibit.” 32 For example, the particularity requirement was
not met when a magistrate issued a warrant only referencing a search
for a “single dwelling [residence] . . . blue in color.” 33 Although the
police had probable cause to look for illegal weapons and explosives,
are subject to a ‘broad range of [restrictions] that might infringe constitutional rights
in a free society.’” (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002))).
26
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971).
27
Id. at 467 (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects against general
warrants that would authorize an “exploratory rummaging in a person’s
belongings”).
28
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999).
29
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).
30
Id.
31
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); see also Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965).
32
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
33
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 558 (2004).
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the language in the warrant “did not describe the items to be seized at
all.” 34 By failing to particularly describe the “place to be searched” or
“the persons or things to be seized,” 35 the warrant failed to meet the
particularity requirement and was therefore unconstitutional. 36
While executing a warrant, a police officer may only search
and seize items specified in the warrant. 37 Again, a reasonableness
standard is applied to determine whether the evidence seized was
within the scope of the warrant. 38 For example, “[i]f you are looking
for an adult elephant, searching for it in a chest of drawers is not
reasonable.” 39 However, the hypothetical at the beginning of this Note
provides a more realistic illustration. There, the officer was authorized
to search anywhere in the house where illegal drugs could reasonably
be located. 40 The officer could open and examine the freezer door, the
desk drawer, a storage box, kitchen cabinets, and so on to attempt to
find illegal drugs. But his search must remain within the bounds of
reasonableness. 41 For example, it might be unreasonable to search the
defendant’s tax records if the warrant did not authorize a search for
financial documents in connection with drug trafficking. 42
C. The Plain View Doctrine
What if the officer opens a box in the basement while looking
for drugs, but instead inadvertently discovers hundreds of photos of
child pornography? The child pornography is clearly outside the scope
of the search warrant. But since the criminality of the photos is so
patently obvious, it would be illogical for the law to require the officer
to ignore this incriminating evidence. In response, the Supreme Court
34

Id. (emphasis in original).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36
Groh, 540 U.S. at 558.
37
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980).
38
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991); see also Platteville Area
Apartment Ass’n v. City of Platteville, 179 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 1999).
39
Platteville, 179 F.3d at 579.
40
See Walter, 447 U.S. at 656.
41
See id.
42
See id.
35
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has carved out an exception to the general warrant requirement:
officers are allowed to seize incriminating evidence in plain view even
though outside the scope of the original warrant. 43 Referred to as the
plain view doctrine, this is an “exception to the general rule that
warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.” 44
The plain view doctrine applies to situations where “the police
have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the
course of the search come across some other article of incriminating
character.” 45 The Supreme Court clarified the plain view doctrine in
its 1990 Horton v. California decision. 46 In Horton, the warrant
authorized a search of the defendant’s house for the proceeds of a
robbery, specifically three stolen rings. 47 While executing the search
of the defendant’s residence, the police discovered numerous illegal
weapons in plain view and seized them. 48 The defendant challenged
the admissibility of the weapons by arguing that they were seized
outside the scope of the warrant. 49
The Supreme Court’s analysis focused on the relationship
between individual privacy rights and lawful searches. 50 The Court
noted that when a warrant is executed, there are two types of rights
that may be invaded. First, the search itself compromises a person’s
privacy interests. 51 Second, a seizure deprives a person of his or her
property rights. 52 The Court reasoned that when the police viewed the
weapons, there was no additional or unauthorized privacy violation
since the police were already lawfully present in the defendant’s house
under the original warrant. 53 Therefore, the plain view doctrine is best

43

See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135 (1990).
Id. at 133.
45
Id. at 135.
46
See id. at 142.
47
Id. at 130–31.
48
Id. at 131.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 133.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 141–42.
44
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viewed as an exception to the protection against illegal seizures. 54
However, the defendant’s property rights were not violated because he
had no legal right to possess the weapons in the first place, and the
illegality of the weapons became immediately apparent. 55 Since a
person’s privacy or property rights are not violated in these situations,
the plain view doctrine comports with the Fourth Amendment. 56
The Supreme Court formulated three requirements for
evidence to be admitted under the plain view doctrine. First, the
officer must “be lawfully located in a place from which the object can
be plainly seen.” 57 Second, the officer must have a lawful right of
access to the object. 58 Third, the incriminating character of the item in
plain view must be “immediately apparent.” 59 If an item is seized
when these three requirements are met, it is admissible because the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights have not been violated. 60
Horton was decided in a pre-modern computer era and in the
context of traditional physical evidence: guns, drugs, photos, physical
documents, and so on. 61 Computer technology as we know it today did
not exist; it was relatively primitive and the internet was basically
nonexistent. 62 In fact, Horton was decided in 1990, the same year that
marked the invention of HTML, a programming code that allowed the
formation of our modern internet system known as the “world wide
web.” 63 The question before courts today is whether the pre-computer
era plain view doctrine established in Horton should be applied to
computer searches.

54

Id. at 133.
Id. at 141–42.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 136–37.
58
Id.
59
Id. (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326–27 (1987)).
60
See id.
61
See generally id. at 129–50.
62
See generally Timeline of Computer History, THE COMPUTER HISTORY
MUSEUM, http://computerhistory.org/timeline/?category=net (last visited Apr. 30,
2010).
63
See id.
55
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II. OUR DIGITAL LIVES
Computers permeate nearly every aspect of American life. 64
This has created “an unimaginably vast amount of digital information
which is getting vaster ever more rapidly.” 65 And this expansion is not
going to stop; in fact, the amount of digital information in the world is
predicted to increase tenfold every five years. 66
Besides the vast sum of digital information that exists, people
have created a digital life where formerly physical data have been
converted into digital form. 67 For example, “rather than storing
images, movies, documents, correspondence, [or] personal records” in
physical form, people instead store this information in digital media. 68
However, people are not merely converting files one-for-one from
physical to digital. 69 Computer technology has made it easier for
people to create an unlimited number of files, images, and documents.
For example, it is estimated that Facebook, a social networking
website, stores approximately 40 billion user photos. 70
Additionally, computers often record information even if
unintended by the user. 71 For instance, Google records every e-mail
sent on its Gmail electronic mail service, as well as any instant
messaging communication through Gmail. 72 Additionally, a user’s
internet history is recorded on their computer hard drive, which creates
a trail of what a person does on his or her computer. 73 A lay computer
64

David J. S. Ziff, Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on the Execution of
Computer Searches Conducted Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 841,
841 (2005).
65
Data, Data Everywhere, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2010.
66
Id.
67
See RayMing Chang, Why the Plain View Doctrine Should Not Apply to
Digital Evidence, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 31, 35 (2007).
68
Id.
69
See Data, Data Everywhere, supra note 65.
70
Id.
71
See United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir. 1999); Russo v.
State, 228 S.W.3d 779, 790 (Tex. App. 2007).
72
See Gmail Privacy Notice, GMAIL,
http://mail.google.com/mail/help/privacy.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2010).
73
See Upham, 168 F.3d at 537; Russo, 228 S.W.3d at 790.
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user might not even know these files exist. But with the proper
software, law enforcement can view these files and know what
websites a user has visited and what files on his or her computer have
been created or opened. 74
Since criminals are likely to use computers for illegal activity,
this digital information is a valuable source of evidence for law
enforcement agencies. 75 Today, search warrants frequently include
language that authorizes the seizure of computers and other digital
devices. 76 However, as more information is stored in digital form, it
has become increasingly difficult to separate innocuous files from
incriminating files during the search of a computer. 77
In practice, criminals will hide, mislabel, and bury
incriminating evidence among the thousands of innocuous files on a
computer. 78 This makes it extremely difficult and time-consuming for
law enforcement to discover incriminating evidence. 79 It is unlikely
that a criminal will label files on his computer “child pornography,”
“debts for illegal drugs,” or “incriminating contact list.” 80 So in order
to conduct an effective search, police must open almost every file on a
computer. 81 To assist, departments have employed sophisticated
software that analyzes and categorizes this immense amount of data
into a viewable, workable format. 82
74

See id.
Ziff, supra note 64, at 841.
76
E.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 515–16 (4th Cir. 2010)
(warrant authorizing a search of “[a]ny and all computer systems and digital storage
media”); see also United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 780–81 (7th Cir. 2010)
(warrant authorizing a search of “video tapes, CD’s or other digital media,
computers, and the contents of said computers, tapes, or other electronic media”).
77
See United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 528–29 (E.D. Va. 1999).
78
Id. at 528.
79
See id.
80
See id.; see also United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006)
(finding that “[c]riminals will do all they can to conceal contraband”).
81
See Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 528 (holding that “[a]lthough care must be taken
to minimize the intrusion, records searches require that many, and often all,
documents in the targeted location be searched”).
82
See United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 781 (7th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1083–84 (10th Cir. 2009); Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
75
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Federal and state courts across the United States are more
frequently confronted with cases involving digital searches and
seizures. 83 Without clear guidance from the Supreme Court, the
federal circuits have approached this situation differently. For
example, the Tenth Circuit has held that a subjective intent standard
should be applied when determining whether digital evidence is
admissible. 84 Further, the Ninth Circuit has advocated abandoning the
plain view doctrine altogether in digital evidence cases, and instead
has sought to adopt a multistep prophylactic approach to prevent
overly broad computer searches. 85 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit, as
well as the majority of other federal circuits, has continued to apply
traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine to digital evidence cases. 86
The most prudent approach for courts to follow in future digital
evidence cases is to adhere to traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Courts should determine whether the search was reasonable, whether
the evidence fell within the plain view doctrine, and whether the
warrant met the particularity requirement. Computer searches raise
significant privacy concerns, and courts should be aware of the
differences between physical and digital evidence. However, it makes
more sense to incrementally develop the contours of the plain view
doctrine than to prematurely abandon it and develop a completely new
test or framework. As more cases come before the courts, the contours
of Fourth Amendment doctrine will incrementally develop so that
individuals’ privacy and property rights will remain protected.

83

See United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 514 (4th Cir. 2010); Mann, 592
F.3d at 782; United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1999); Gray, 78
F. Supp. 2d at 528.
84
See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273.
85
See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1006
(9th Cir. 2009).
86
See generally Williams, 592 F.3d 511; Mann, 592 F.3d at 785; United States
v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Miranda, 325 Fed.
App’x 858 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84 (1st Cir. 1999);
United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374 (6th Cir. 1988).
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III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS’ APPROACHES TO
DIGITAL EVIDENCE CASES
Although United States v. Mann is the focus of this Note, the
Seventh Circuit’s analysis heavily relies on two previous opinions
from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. In order to understand the Mann
decision and why the traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine is the
proper standard for courts to follow, it is important to discuss the facts
and analyses that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits applied to their
respective digital evidence cases.
A. The Tenth Circuit’s Subjective Standard
In 1999, the Tenth Circuit decided United States v. Carey, one
of the first federal appeal level decisions to examine Fourth
Amendment search and seizure doctrine in the context of digital
evidence. 87 The case stemmed from an at-home arrest of the defendant
for the sale and possession of cocaine. 88 The police observed a bong in
plain view when they arrested Carey in his apartment. 89 Carey then
consented to a search of his apartment by signing a written consent
form. 90 The police discovered and seized illegal drugs as well as two
computers believed to contain more evidence of drug trafficking. 91
After the computers were seized, a magistrate issued a warrant
authorizing a search of both computers for “names, telephone
numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence
pertaining to the sale and distribution of controlled substances.” 92 The
detective who conducted the search first manually inspected the
computer and entered keyword searches such as “money, accounts,
[or] people” to locate files with these types of filenames. 93 However,
87

See 172 F.3d at 1273.
Id. at 1270.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. (emphasis added).
93
Id. at 1271.
88
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this method did not uncover any files related to drugs. 94 The detective
continued to explore the directories and discovered hundreds of JPG
image files—the first one he opened was child pornography. 95 He then
proceeded to save 240 JPG image files to nineteen disks and opened a
sampling of five to seven images from each disk, most of which were
child pornography. 96
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress all of the child
pornography. 97 During the hearing on the motion to suppress, the
detective testified that once he discovered the first image of child
pornography, he diverted from his original search for drug activity and
began a second search for child pornography. 98
The defendant argued that the detective exceeded the scope of
the warrant, which only authorized a search for “documentary
evidence,” not image files. 99 The government argued that the images
were admissible because they were properly seized under the plain
view doctrine. 100
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis noted that “[t]he essential inquiry
when faced with challenges under the Fourth Amendment is whether
the search or seizure was reasonable.” 101 The warrant authorized a
search of both computers for files with “names, telephone numbers,
ledgers, receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence
pertaining to the sale and distribution of controlled substances.” 102 The
court narrowly interpreted the warrant’s language to only authorize a
search for “documentary files,” such as Word, Excel, or Adobe PDF
documents that would contain text-based information. 103 Reasoning
94

Id.
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 1272.
100
Id.
101
Id. (quoting O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465, 1472 (10th Cir.
1989)).
102
Id. at 1272–73 (emphasis added).
103
See id.; United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1093 (10th Cir. 2009)
(discussing various computer file types and extensions).
95

503

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010

13

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 5, Issue 2

Spring 2010

that image files are not “documentary” in nature, the court held that
the image files found in the defendant’s computer were not within the
scope of the warrant. 104 Therefore, the detective exceeded the scope of
the warrant by downloading and opening the JPG images. 105 And
since the detective could not lawfully open or view any image files
during his search, the child pornography did not satisfy the
requirements of the plain view doctrine. 106
The Tenth Circuit also held that the detective should have
known that the content of the image files was outside the scope of the
warrant prior to opening them because “most featured a sexually
suggestive title.” 107 Further, even if the officer did not know the
content of the first file, the detective should have known after opening
it that the other files in the directory were likely to be child
pornography as well. 108 At this point, the detective should have
stopped his search and obtained a second warrant to search for child
pornography. 109 There would have been probable cause for a second
warrant based on the one known child pornography file, as well as the
other sexually suggestive file names. 110
The court’s primary basis for holding the image files
inadmissible rested on the detective’s own admission at the hearing. 111
The court found it “plainly evident [that] each time he opened a
subsequent JPG file, he expected to find child pornography and not
material related to drugs.” 112 This departure marked the end point of
the original search and constituted a second, unauthorized, and illegal
search of the defendant’s computer. 113 By exceeding the scope of the
104

Carey, 172 F.3d at 1272–73.
Id.
106
See id.; see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990) (holding
that the plain view doctrine requires that the officer must “be lawfully located in a
place from which the object can be plainly seen”).
107
Carey, 172 F.3d at 1274.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 1276 (Baldock, J., concurring).
110
Id. at 1276–77.
111
See id. at 1273 (majority opinion).
112
Id.
113
See id.
105
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warrant, the detective’s search was unreasonable, and any fruits of that
search were inadmissible. 114
The Tenth Circuit explicitly stated that Carey did not involve
the plain view doctrine. 115 Instead, the court’s analysis centered on the
subjective intent of the officer who admitted that he diverged from his
original search and began a second search for more evidence of child
pornography. 116 In contrast, if the warrant had authorized a search for
“image files” for evidence relating to drug trafficking, the court may
have come to a different conclusion. Under this alternative scenario,
the plain view doctrine would apply since the detective would be in a
lawful position to open the image files, and the criminality of the child
pornography would be immediately apparent. 117
Subsequent courts and scholars have interpreted Carey
differently. The Carey decision goes to great lengths to state that its
ruling was fact-specific and that it was not addressing the broad use of
the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases. 118 Ten years after
Carey, the Tenth Circuit highlighted its limitation in United States v.
Burgess. 119 In Burgess, a police detective was executing a search of
the defendant’s computer for evidence related to illegal drug
activity. 120 The detective inadvertently discovered child pornography;
however, he stopped his search after viewing the first image and
obtained a second warrant to search for child pornography. 121 He then
renewed his search and discovered approximately 70,000 images of
child pornography. 122 The district court held that these images were
properly seized and admissible. 123
114

See id.
Id. (“Although the question of what constitutes ‘plain view’ in the context of
computer files is intriguing and appears to be an issue of first impression for this
court, and many others, we do not need to reach it here.”).
116
See id. at 1272–73.
117
See id.; see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990).
118
See Carey, 172 F.3d. at 1273.
119
576 F.3d 1078, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009).
120
Id. at 1083–84.
121
Id. at 1084.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 1095.
115
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The Tenth Circuit distinguished the Carey and Burgess
holdings on factual grounds. First, the officer in Burgess did not
diverge from his original search and begin a second unauthorized
search as the detective did in Carey. 124 Second, the Burgess decision
reiterated that Carey was fact-dependent and limited. 125 Carey was an
easily decided case because the subjective intent of the detective so
clearly exceeded the scope of the warrant. 126 However, this limits
Carey’s application in cases where the subjective intent of the officer
is not so clear. 127
Some legal scholars who advocate an abandonment of the plain
view doctrine use Carey as a jumping-off point. For example, Orin
Kerr of the George Washington University Law School argues that
Carey adopts a new subjective standard when determining the
reasonableness of a search. 128 Kerr argues that this subjective
approach “offers one significant advantage over the existing objective
test: it turns the emphasis from a question judges are poorly equipped
to answer (the reasonableness of a forensic step) to a question judges
are better positioned to answer (witness credibility).” 129 Kerr attempts
to discredit the knowledge, wisdom, and skill of all judges by arguing
that the process of computer searches is “too complex and fluid” for
judges to grasp. 130
Nevertheless, a subjective standard raises several concerns that
ultimately lead to its impracticability. First, any inquiry into the
subjective intent of the executing officer goes directly against
Supreme Court precedent. 131 In Horton, the Supreme Court based this
conclusion on practical concerns by noting, “evenhanded law
enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards
of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state
124

Id. at 1092.
Id.
126
See id.
127
See id.
128
Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV.
531, 578 (2005); see also Chang, supra note 67, at 46–50.
129
Kerr, supra note 128, at 578.
130
See id.
131
See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990).
125
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of mind of the officer.” 132 The scope of a search warrant is “defined
by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable
cause to believe that it may be found.” 133 In the absence of any
Supreme Court case law supporting a deviation from general Fourth
Amendment precedent, courts should not adopt a new subjective intent
standard in digital evidence cases.
Second, a subjective standard would induce testifying police
officers to perjure themselves in order to admit improperly seized
computer files. For evidence of this temptation, one needs to look no
further than the Tenth Circuit’s United States v. Carey decision. 134
During the hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective Lewis at first
stated that he knew the files likely contained child pornography. 135 He
knew he was exceeding the scope of the warrant, stating, “that
question did arise, and my captain took care of [the issue] through the
county attorney’s office.” 136 After further questioning by the
government, Detective Lewis later recanted his previous statement and
asserted that he did not really know the contents of the JPG files
before opening them. 137 Although the judge rejected his later
testimony, this example illustrates the perverse incentives that would
confront testifying police officers if courts adopted a subjective intent
standard.
Just as the decision itself stated, Carey should be read
narrowly. 138 Although it can be argued that the Tenth Circuit had the
opportunity to address the application of the plain view doctrine to
digital evidence, the court chose not to. 139 Instead, the Tenth Circuit
applied a reasonableness standard to determine whether the detective’s

132

Id.; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that
“[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis”).
133
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).
134
172 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 1999).
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 1276.
139
See Chang, supra note 67, at 48.
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search comported with the protections of the Fourth Amendment,
which it did not. 140
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Prophylactic Test
While the Tenth Circuit hinted at a slight divergence from
traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine, the Ninth Circuit has directly
abandoned it. 141 In 2009, the Ninth Circuit decided United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (“CDT”), a case concerning the
highly-publicized seizure of computer files holding the steroid test
results of Major League Baseball players. 142
The Major League Baseball Players Association (“the
Players”) and Major League Baseball (“MLB”) had entered into an
agreement where all players would be drug tested. 143 Both sides
agreed that the results would be strictly confidential and were intended
only to allow the MLB to determine the degree of steroid use among
athletes. 144 Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (“CDT”) administered,
analyzed, and stored the test results. 145
The federal government suspected that the Bay Area Lab
Cooperative (“Balco”) illegally distributed steroids to baseball
players. 146 The government established probable cause to seize the test
results of ten players, and a magistrate issued a search warrant
authorizing such seizure from CDT. 147 Federal agents executed the
warrant and seized not only the records of the ten players, but also
reviewed the records of hundreds of other players who had been

140

See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1272.
See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989,
1006–07 (9th Cir. 2009); Carey, 172 F.3d at 1276.
142
See 579 F.3d at 993.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
141
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tested. 148 CDT and the Players moved to have the government return
the test results that were improperly seized. 149
The Ninth Circuit analogized the facts in CDT to a previous
Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Tamura. 150 In Tamura, the
government seized thousands of paper records relating to the
defendant’s business. 151 Instead of separating innocuous files from
incriminating ones on site, the government seized all of the files and
planned to later separate them. 152 Tamura argued that the scope of the
search was too broad and resulted in a wholesale seizure of documents
not mentioned in the warrant. 153 The government argued that this
broad seizure was necessary because “the documents were
intermingled and it was difficult to separate the described documents
from the irrelevant ones” on site. 154 The Ninth Circuit held a search is
restricted to specifically enumerated items in the warrant. 155 By
seizing such a large amount of unrelated files, the government’s search
and seizure was significantly intrusive and violated Fourth
Amendment principles.156 The CDT court equated the wholesale
seizure of business files in Tamura to the federal agents in CDT who

148

Id.
Id. at 993–94.
150
Id. at 995–96.
151
United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 1982).
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. (“As a general rule, in searches made pursuant to warrants only the
specifically enumerated items may be seized.”).
156
Id.; but see United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383–84 (6th Cir.
1988) (holding that in the context of a computer search “it was inevitable that the
officers would seize documents that were not relevant to the proceedings at hand.
We do not think it is reasonable to have required the officers to sift though the large
mass of documents and computer files found in the Hensons’ office, in an effort to
segregate those few papers that were outside the warrant.”); United States v. Turner,
13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1988) (“Often it is simply impractical to search a
computer at the search site because of the time and expertise required to unlock all
sources of information.”).
149
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seizure from CDT of the test results of hundreds of players not
authorized by the warrant. 157
Much of the court’s reasoning rested on the fact that “[t]he
Government demonstrated a callous disregard for the rights of those
persons whose records were seized and searched outside the
warrant.” 158 The warrant contained restrictions on how the seized data
was to be handled; however, federal agents explicitly disregarded
these limitations. 159 For example, the warrant specified that neutral
computer personnel, not investigating agents, were supposed to
segregate relevant from irrelevant files. 160 Nevertheless, the federal
agents immediately made copies of all files and examined the test
results themselves. 161 At hearing, an Assistant United States Attorney
even stated that a federal agent “briefly [perused the file] to see if
there was anything above and beyond that which was authorized for
seizure in the initial warrant.” 162
Instead of seeing the federal agents’ actions as a single act of
malfeasance, the Ninth Circuit concluded “that such over-seizing is an
inherent part of the electronic search process” and will become a more
prevalent problem with digital evidence. 163 In order to protect against
this danger, the Ninth Circuit prescribed a five-part test that warrantissuing magistrates should follow in digital evidence cases: (1)
reliance on the plain view doctrine must be waived in digital evidence
cases; (2) an independent third party must review, segregate, and
redact files before being given to investigators; (3) warrants must
disclose the risks of destruction of information and prior efforts to
seize that information; (4) the government’s search protocol must be
designed to uncover only information for which it has probable cause;
and (5) the government must either destroy or return evidence outside
157

See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 997–
99 (9th Cir. 2009).
158
Id. at 997.
159
Id. at 995–97.
160
Id. at 995–96.
161
Id. at 996–97.
162
Id. at 1010 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
163
Id. at 1006 (majority opinion).

510

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss2/7

20

Blake: Let's Be Reasonable: Fourth Amendment Principles in the Digital A

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 5, Issue 2

Spring 2010

the scope of the warrant. 164 The Ninth Circuit was reluctant to call this
a test and instead offered it as a “useful tool for the future.”165
However, at least one decision from the Northern District of California
has treated the CDT test as the new Fourth Amendment standard to
apply in the Ninth Circuit. 166
Although such a prophylactic approach may seem attractive,
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in CDT is overbroad and unnecessary, and
it misinterprets the primary issue of the case. What distinguishes CDT
from the other cases is the fact that the search was unlawful because of
the overbroad and intrusive actions of the federal agents conducting
it. 167 The majority decision itself recognized that the seizure at issue
was an “obvious case of deliberate overreaching by the government in
an effort to seize data as to which it lacked probable cause.” 168
The Ninth Circuit could have concluded that the intrusive and
illegal actions by the federal agents constituted a single event. Instead,
the court broadly concluded that such “over-seizing is an inherent part
of the electronic search process.” 169 As discussed in Judge Callahan’s
concurrence and dissent, “the majority’s prescriptions go significantly
beyond what is necessary for it to resolve this case.” 170 Judge Callahan
argues that instead of casting traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine
aside, “the prudent course would be to allow [its] contours . . . to
develop incrementally through the normal course of fact-based case
adjudication.” 171 The Ninth Circuit would have reached the same
result if it had applied traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine. 172 The
government’s seizure would have grossly exceeded the scope of the

164

Id.
Id. at 1007.
166
United States v. Cerna, No. CR 08-0730 WHA, 2009 WL 5125920, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Dec 21, 2009).
167
See Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc,, 579 F.3d at 997.
168
Id. at 1000.
169
Id. at 1006.
170
Id. at 1012 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171
Id. at 1013.
172
See id. at 1012–13.
165
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warrant, the search would have been determined to be unreasonable,
and the test results of the other players would have been suppressed. 173
In the short time since the CDT decision, criminal defendants
have attempted to persuade other courts to follow this new standard. 174
However, most courts outside of the Ninth Circuit have been hesitant
to adopt the prophylactic CDT test. 175 The Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Mann has been the only federal appellate court to address
CDT to date, and it was skeptical of CDT’s overbroad approach. 176
Instead, the Seventh Circuit aligned its decision closer to Judge
Callahan’s CDT dissent and sought to allow traditional Fourth
Amendment doctrine to evolve in digital evidence cases. 177
Federal district and state courts have suggested that the CDT
standard “creates more problems than it solves” 178 and is only an
optional, useful tool for the future. 179 These courts instead focus on the
specific facts in CDT that involved egregious conduct by government
agents. 180 Whereas most courts have viewed egregious police
misconduct to be the exception, the Ninth Circuit appears to reason
that police misconduct will be the rule in future digital evidence
173

See id. at 995–97 (majority opinion). This distinction is very similar to the
Tenth Circuit’s Carey decision. Both Carey and CDT involved situations where the
executing officers greatly exceeded the scope of the warrant, thereby making their
searches unreasonable and providing grounds to suppress the evidence. The Ninth
and Tenth Circuits adopted new frameworks for digital evidence cases, even though
the divergence was unnecessary to resolve each case.
174
See, e.g., United States v. Sedaghaty, Cr. No. 05-60008-HO, 2010 WL
1490306, at *5 (D. Or. Apr. 13, 2010); United States v. Wilbur, No. CR09-191 MJP,
2010 WL 519735, at *16 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 4, 2010); United States v. Kim, 677 F.
Supp. 2d 930, 946 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
175
See id.
176
See United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785–86 (7th Cir. 2010).
177
Id. at 785. The details of United States v. Mann will be discussed in further
detail infra.
178
United States v. Farlow, No. CR-09-38-B-W, 2009 WL 4728690, at *6 n.3
(D. Me. Dec. 3, 2009) (arguing that the new standard is unnecessary because “the
traditional sanction for police misconduct of this sort remains exclusion of
evidence”).
179
See United States v. King, CR No. 09-00207 DAE, 2010 WL 727981, at *25
(D. Haw. Mar. 1, 2010).
180
Farlow, 2009 WL 4728690, at *6 n.3.
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cases. 181 Under this line of thinking, CDT’s expansive pre-issuance
procedures are justified. However, it is extremely pessimistic to
assume that all law enforcement officials will be as overzealous as the
federal agents in CDT when conducting a digital search.182
Besides, there are existing remedies within the law that deter
law enforcement from exceeding the scope of a warrant or otherwise
acting unlawfully. First, the exclusionary rule deters officers from
acting unlawfully while executing a warrant. 183 The exclusionary rule
prohibits the admission of any evidence at trial that was obtained from
an illegal search or seizure. 184 This rule incentivizes police officers to
conform their conduct to the requirements of the law since police
officers presumably want seized evidence to be admitted in court. 185
Second, if the exclusionary rule does not deter an officer, there is a
civil remedy available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 186 for police violations
of constitutional rights. 187 § 1983 provides redress to any citizen
whose constitutional rights are violated by any person acting under
color of law. 188 Therefore, a citizen would have a meritorious § 1983
suit if a police officer violated her Fourth Amendment rights by
conducting an unreasonable search and seizure. 189 These two existing
181

See id.
See id. (“There is no evidence that police disobedience of search warrant
limitations is so widespread to compel such onerous pre-issuance procedures, and at
the very least the more traditional remedies should be tried first.”).
183
See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (holding the purpose
of the exclusionary rule is “to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty . . . by removing the incentive to disregard it”).
184
See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391–92 (1920).
185
See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217.
186
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”).
187
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597–98 (2006).
188
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
189
See id.
182
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remedies provide sufficient protection to individuals from the
unreasonable or overzealous searches over which the Ninth Circuit
was concerned in CDT, thereby making the prophylactic measures
overbroad and unnecessary. 190
The Ninth Circuit was presented with a factual scenario where
the federal agents’ actions were clearly egregious and exceeded the
scope of the warrant. 191 That in and of itself is enough to suppress the
test results because it constituted an unreasonable search. 192 Instead of
issuing a narrow ruling, the Ninth Circuit adopted an overly broad
approach in an attempt to prevent future police misconduct. 193 The
proper approach would have been to rely on the traditional Fourth
Amendment principles of reasonableness, the particularity
requirement, and the plain view doctrine. Although digital evidence
cases present new issues and problems, the contours of these doctrines
should be allowed to develop incrementally as different factual
scenarios come before courts.
C. The Seventh Circuit Weighs In: United States v. Mann
On January 20, 2010, the Seventh Circuit weighed in on this
issue in United States v. Mann. 194 The Mann decision shares many
similarities with the hypothetical situation posed in the introduction of
this Note. However, the facts of Mann require further development
because of certain significant differences. In 2007, Matthew Mann
worked as a lifeguard instructor for the Red Cross in Tippecanoe
County, Indiana. 195 He installed a video camera in the women’s locker
room in order to record women changing their clothes. 196 However, in
addition to videotaping women in the locker room, he recorded
190

See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1006
(9th Cir. 2009).
191
See id. at 997.
192
See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001).
193
See Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d at 1006.
194
592 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2010).
195
Id. at 780.
196
Id.
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himself installing the camera. 197 One of his female students discovered
the camera, played the tape for herself, and recognized Mann. 198 She
contacted the police department and turned over the video camera and
videotape. 199
Days later, the police obtained a warrant authorizing a search
of Mann’s residence for “video tapes, CD’s or other digital media,
computers, and the contents of said computers, tapes, or other
electronic media, to search for images of women in locker rooms or
other private areas.” 200 The police executed the warrant and seized two
desktop computers, a laptop, and an external hard drive. 201 The next
day, Mann was arrested for voyeurism in violation of Indiana law. 202
Two months later, a police detective conducted a search of
Mann’s computers. 203 He began by creating an exact copy of the
computer hard drives in order to prevent the data from being altered or
destroyed. 204 The detective searched the content of the hard drives
using a software program, known as a “forensic tool kit” (FTK). 205
The FTK software examines every file on the computer and then
displays an overview screen with thumbnail images of every image,
video, and document on the computer. 206
The FTK software also flags computer files using a “KFF
Alert,” or Known File Filter. 207 The software cross-references all
filenames on the computer with a national registry consisting of illegal
files previously seized by other law enforcement agencies. 208 Any
197

Id.
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 780–81.
201
Id. at 781.
202
Id.; see IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-5(a)(2)(b)(1) (2004).
203
Mann, 592 F.3d at 781.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id. The original warrant authorized the detective to search the computer for
any files that might contain voyeurism. At the very least, this authorized the
detective to read the file names on the computer. The KFF cross-reference does not
198
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matches are flagged with a “KFF Alert.” 209 Most files from the
national directory are child pornography. 210
While searching Mann’s computers, the detective discovered
photos of girls taken from a high school locker room, child
pornography, and a story about a swim coach masturbating while
watching young girls swim, possibly written by Mann. 211 No files
were flagged by the KFF Alert during this first search. 212
Two months after the first search, 213 the detective searched
Mann’s external hard drive using the same software program. 214 Four
files on the hard drive were flagged with a KFF Alert, indicating that
the files were likely child pornography. 215 The detective opened every
file on the hard drive, including the four KFF Alert files, which were
indeed child pornography. 216 He also found two more videos from a
high school locker room. 217
Mann moved to suppress the child pornography by arguing that
the detective exceeded the scope of the warrant, but the district court
go beyond what the officer could do with his own eyes. Therefore, the KFF Alert
does not create an additional second search for Fourth Amendment purposes.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id. at 781. The Seventh Circuit commented that it was “problematic that
nearly two months elapsed before Detective Huff began his search of the Western
Digital hard drive despite having found child pornography on the Dell laptop.” Id. at
786. The court was reluctant to specify a proper time frame and only alluded to a
potential constitutional violation at some point. See id. Other courts ruling on this
specific issue have given police departments great flexibility due to practical
considerations, such as time constraints and limited resources. The determining
factor has been whether the police officers were acting in good faith to stay within
the boundaries of the warrant. See generally United States v. Syphers, 296 F. Supp.
2d 50, 59 (D. N.H. 2003); United States v. Yung, 786 F. Supp. 1561, 1569 (D. Kan.
1992); but see United States v. Brunette, 76 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D. Me. 1999)
(holding that a search was unlawful when it was executed sixty-two days after the
seizure of the computer and the warrant was only valid for sixty days).
214
Mann, 592 F.3d at 781.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id.
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denied his motion. 218 The court reasoned that the warrant authorized
the detective to examine any files on the computer that may have
involved voyeurism, and that the detective never abandoned his search
for voyeurism when he inadvertently discovered the child
pornography. 219 Although outside the scope of the warrant, the district
court held that the child pornography was admissible under the plain
view doctrine. 220 Mann then entered a conditional guilty plea to one
count of possession of child pornography and appealed the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress. 221
Mann’s appeal rested on three arguments. First, Mann argued
that by utilizing the FTK software, the detective’s search was
unreasonable because it exceeded the scope of the warrant. 222 Mann
interpreted the warrant to be restrictive—only authorizing a search for
“images of women in locker rooms and other private places.” 223 Mann
argues that he was subjected to a general search since every file on his
computer was examined by the software. 224 The Seventh Circuit
rejected this argument based on practical concerns, reasoning that
these types of software programs are essential tools for law
enforcement since digital files “could be nearly anywhere on the
computers.” 225 The court distinguished physical searches from digital
searches by noting, “[u]nlike a physical object that can be immediately
identified as responsive to the warrant or not, computer files may be
manipulated to hide their true contents.” 226 Therefore the court held
that it was reasonable for the detective to both use the FTK software
program and briefly examine all files on the computer in order to
determine their contents. 227

218

Id. at 781–82.
Id.
220
See id. at 782.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
See id.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
See id. at 782–83.
219
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Second, relying on the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in
United States v. Carey, Mann argued that the detective turned the
specific search into a general search by looking for evidence of crimes
unrelated to voyeurism. 228 The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument
because it distinguished the facts in Mann from those in Carey. 229
First, the warrant in Carey only authorized a search for documentary
evidence (i.e., Word or Excel documents), but the detective unlawfully
extended his search by opening image files. 230 In contrast, the Mann
warrant authorized the detective to examine any image file that may
have been related to voyeurism. 231 Therefore, the search was
reasonable because the detective in Mann opened files within the
scope of the warrant. 232
The Carey and Mann facts can be further distinguished by
scrutinizing the subjective intent of the officer executing the
warrant. 233 The officer in Carey admitted that after he discovered the
first image of child pornography, he diverged from his original search
for evidence of drug dealing. 234 The officer’s second, unauthorized
search for child pornography exceeded the scope of the warrant and
was therefore unreasonable. 235 In contrast, the detective in Mann
testified that he “continued to look for items with voyeurism” and only
made notations where he inadvertently discovered child

228

Id. at 783.
Id. at 783–85.
230
Id. at 783.
231
Id. The warrant authorized a search for “video tapes, CD’s or other digital
media, computers, and the contents of said computers, tapes, or other electronic
media, to search for images of women in locker rooms or other private areas.” Id. at
780–81.
232
Id. at 783–84.
233
Id. at 784. The Supreme Court has held that the subjective intent of the
executing officer is irrelevant in determining whether the search was reasonable. See
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding “[s]ubjective intentions
play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”). Despite this,
the Seventh Circuit used this factual difference to further distinguish the Mann
decision since Carey so heavily relied on subjective intent in reaching its holding.
234
United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999).
235
See id.
229
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pornography. 236 The Seventh Circuit held that his search was
reasonable since he never abandoned his search for evidence of
voyeurism. 237
Mann’s third argument urged the Seventh Circuit to adopt the
prophylactic rules advocated by the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. 238 The Seventh Circuit rejected this
preventative approach because it was overbroad. 239 The Seventh
Circuit recognized that “there is nothing in the Supreme Court’s case
law (or the Ninth Circuit’s for that matter) counseling the complete
abandonment of the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases.” 240
Instead, the proper approach “would be to allow the contours of the
plain view doctrine to develop incrementally through the normal
course of fact-based case adjudication.” 241 The court saw the Ninth
Circuit’s approach as diverging from Fourth Amendment precedent,
when there is no indication or need to do so. 242
The Seventh Circuit based its holding on the traditional
principles of Fourth Amendment analysis. First, the court held that
warrants must “describe with particularity the things to be seized and
that searches are narrowly tailored to uncover only those things
described.” 243 The Mann court did not abandon the plain view doctrine
and emphasized that reasonableness is the most appropriate standard
to apply when determining whether a search violated the protections of
the Fourth Amendment. 244
Applying a reasonableness standard, the court affirmed the
district court’s ruling with one exception. 245 The Seventh Circuit
236

Mann, 592 F.3d at 784.
See id.
238
Id. at 785.
239
Id. (citing United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989,
1013 (9th Cir. 2009) (Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
240
Id.
241
Id. (citing Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 1013 (Callahan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
242
See id.
243
Id. at 786.
244
Id. at 785–86.
245
See id. at 786.
237
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reversed the district court’s ruling with respect to the four images
flagged by the KFF Alert, holding them inadmissible. 246 The court
reasoned that the detective knew or should have known that any file
tagged by the KFF Alert was likely child pornography, which was
material outside the scope of the warrant. 247 By opening the files, the
detective exceeded the scope of the original warrant that only
authorized a “search for images of women in locker rooms or other
private areas.” 248 Besides these four images, the court held that the
detective’s actions “were reasonable and within the scope of the
warrant’s authorization.” 249
The Seventh Circuit reached the correct conclusion in Mann
because it adhered to the principles of Fourth Amendment search and
seizure doctrine. It ultimately rested its conclusion on whether the
search was reasonable. The warrant authorized the officer to search for
evidence of voyeurism, which meant he could open image files. In
turn, any image he opened that turned out to be child pornography fell
within the plain view doctrine. But the Seventh Circuit correctly
distinguished the images tagged with a KFF Alert by reasoning that
the officer should have known those images were likely child
pornography. The facts of Mann were relatively straightforward;
however, many different factual scenarios have come before other
courts, and understanding these distinctions is important to fully grasp
Fourth Amendment doctrine in the digital age.
IV. THE REASONABLE APPROACH: COMMON FACT PATTERNS TO GUIDE
FUTURE COURTS
Besides the Seventh Circuit, the majority of other federal
circuit courts that have addressed this issue continue to apply
246

Id.
Id. at 784.
248
Id. at 781.
249
Id. at 786 (citing United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir.
2006) (a computer search may be “as extensive as reasonably required to locate the
items described in the warrant” (quoting United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343,
1352 (11th Cir. 1982)))).
247
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traditional Fourth Amendment principles: a reasonableness standard,
the particularity requirement, and the plain view doctrine. 250 Today’s
Fourth Amendment doctrine is the result of decades of continuously
evolving court precedent. Digital evidence and computers should not
cast doubt on this well-developed legal doctrine. Instead, it should be
viewed as a continuation of the evolving common law.
As more digital evidence cases come before courts, the
contours of the Fourth Amendment and digital evidence will become
more apparent. Several common fact patterns have emerged, not all of
which were implicated in United States v. Mann, 251 United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 252 or United States v. Carey. 253
These patterns will now be categorized and examined in order to
provide a usable framework for future courts.
A. The Particularity Requirement
The Fourth Amendment prohibits general warrants that
authorize “exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” 254
Instead, the Constitution requires that a warrant “particularly
describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.” 255 Referred to as the particularity requirement, a warrant must
“identif[y] the items to be seized by their relation to designated
crimes” and must “leave[] nothing to the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant.” 256
250

See United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 514 (4th Cir. 2010); Mann,
592 F.3d at 782; United States v. Miranda, 325 Fed. Appx. 858, 860 (11th Cir.
2009); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84, 88–89 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d
1374, 1382 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 528 (E.D. Va.
1999).
251
See 592 F.3d at 780–82.
252
See 579 F.3d 989, 993–94 (9th Cir. 2009).
253
See 172 F.3d 1268, 1270–71 (10th Cir. 1999).
254
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976).
255
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
256
United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 519 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing
Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480–82).
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Due to the vast amount of information that can be stored on a
computer, the particularity requirement is becoming increasingly
important in digital evidence cases. 257 Therefore, “warrants for
computer searches must affirmatively limit the search to evidence of
specific federal crimes or specific types of material.” 258 In other
words, a warrant cannot authorize a search of an individual’s entire
computer, where a police officer can “search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges.” 259
Nevertheless, the degree of specificity required is flexible, depends on
the individual circumstances of each case, and “will vary depending
on the crime involved and the types of items sought.” 260 Limiting the
search to certain file types or crimes is important, but the warrant
cannot be required to be so specific as to be a “constitutional strait
jacket” on the executing officer. 261
Magistrates are frequently confronted with a situation where
prior to the actual search, the officers do not know exactly what type
of computer devices an individual has in his possession. 262 As a result,
warrants often broadly describe the type of physical devices to be
searched and seized. 263 In order for the warrant to meet the
particularity requirement, the generality regarding the physical units to
be seized needs to be counterbalanced with limitations on the specific
content to be searched for within the computer. 264
257

See United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 2005).
Id. (emphasis added).
259
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).
260
United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir. 1988); see also
United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the generic
classification in the language of the warrant was acceptable since “no more specific
description of the computer equipment sought was possible”).
261
United States v. Phillips, 588 F.3d 218, 223 (4th Cir. 2009).
262
E.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 520–21 (4th Cir. 2010);
Henson, 848 F.2d at 1382–83.
263
See generally United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 780–81 (7th Cir. 2010)
(warrant authorizing search for “video tapes, CD’s or other digital media, computers,
and the contents of said computers, tapes, or other electronic media”); United States
v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 2009) (authorizing a search of “computer
records”).
264
See United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 2005).
258
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An illustration of a warrant meeting the particularity
requirement in the digital context is the Ninth Circuit’s United States
v. Burgess. 265 The warrant in Burgess authorized a search for
“computer records” that “would tend to show conspiracy to sell drugs,
including pay-owe sheets, address books, rolodexes, pagers, firearms
and monies.” 266 The Ninth Circuit held that the warrant was not overly
broad since it “‘contained sufficiently particularized language’
creating ‘a nexus’ with the crime to be investigated.” 267
In contrast, United States v. Otero provides an example of an
overly broad warrant that did not meet the particularity requirement. 268
The police suspected that Otero, a postal worker, was stealing letters
from credit card companies that were supposed to be delivered on his
route. 269 After planting two test letters that failed to be delivered, the
police executed a warrant to search Otero’s house. 270 The warrant
authorized a search for “any and all information and/or data stored . . .
on computer media . . .” 271 The warrant did not limit the search to
certain computer file types (i.e., Word documents, PDF files, or image
files), nor did it limit the specific content to be searched (i.e., evidence
of mail or credit card fraud).272 The Tenth Circuit held that the warrant
failed to describe the items to be seized with “technical precision [or]
practical accuracy, and it therefore lack[ed] sufficient particularity.” 273

265

576 F.3d at 1091
Id. at 1083.
267
Id. at 1091 (citing in part United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1271
(10th Cir. 2006); see also Mann, 592 F.3d 780–81 (warrant authorizing a search of
computers only for “images of women in locker rooms or other private areas”);
United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999).
268
563 F.3d 1127, 1133 (10th Cir. 2009).
269
Id. at 1129.
270
Id.
271
Id. at 1130.
272
See id.
273
Id. at 1132; see also United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 863 (10th Cir.
2005) (holding that a search was invalid because it did not limit the search to any
particular files or any particular federal crime. “The warrant thus permitted the
officers to search for anything—from child pornography to tax returns to private
correspondence.”).
266
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A warrant must be as specific as the circumstances allow. 274 If
a warrant authorizes the seizure of any computer device and search for
any incriminating evidence, a court will likely hold any file found
pursuant to the warrant to be inadmissible. 275 Instead, a warrant must
affirmatively state either (1) the type of documents to be searched for
(documents, images, videos, etc.) or (2) the type of content to be
searched for (financial data, pornographic images, drug activity,
etc.). 276 The more specific a warrant, the more likely computer files
seized pursuant to that warrant will be held admissible in court.
B. Common Fact Patterns under the Plain View Doctrine
There are many factual scenarios that may arise when an
officer is searching a computer. These factual complexities make it
difficult to craft a clear, black-and-white rule for digital evidence
cases. Below are summaries of common factual scenarios and
illustrations of how courts have determined whether digital evidence
fell within the plain view doctrine. By understanding how the plain
view doctrine has been applied so far, future courts will be able to
better understand how to decide new and complex issues that will arise
in future digital evidence cases.
1. Was the officer looking for the same types of files listed in the
warrant?
To meet the particularity requirement, a warrant must
affirmatively state either the type of files or specific content to be
searched for. 277 In practice, it is very difficult for an officer to tightly
restrict his search but still conduct a thorough investigation. 278 As
several courts readily point out, it is very unlikely for a criminal to

274

United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir. 1988).
See Otero, 563 F.3d at 1132.
276
See Riccardi, 405 F.3d at 862.
277
Id.
278
See generally Henson, 848 F.2d at 1383.
275
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label or organize computer files so their criminality is readily
apparent. 279
There are a number of ways to manipulate computer files to
disguise their illegal nature. The easiest way is to use a deceptive file
name. 280 Few criminals “keep documents of their criminal transactions
in a folder marked ‘criminal records.’” 281 If an individual has a Word
document with the recipe for manufacturing methamphetamine, he can
disguise this file’s true nature by naming it anything other than “meth
stuff.” 282 File names for images can be even more deceptive.
Computers will often automatically name an image file with a
seemingly random file name—for example, “Img_5777_875.jpg” or
“DC001352.jpg.” 283 These types of file names give no indication of
the file’s content, so an officer must open each file in order to see what
the file actually contains. 284
A second way to hide incriminating evidence is to change the
file extension type. There are dozens of different file types. 285 By
modifying a file’s extension, an individual can conceal the true file
type and even prevent the file from being opened. 286 For example, if a
file was created as a Microsoft Word document (.doc) and is
subsequently changed to an Adobe file (.pdf), the file will be
unreadable and cannot be opened. 287 Some software programs used by
279

See United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Images can be
hidden in all manner of files, even word processing documents and spreadsheets.
Criminals will do all they can to conceal contraband, including the simple expedient
of changing the names and extensions of files to disguise their content from the
casual observer.”); United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 1999)
(holding a criminal will “often intentionally mislabel files, or attempt to bury
incriminating files within innocuously named directories”).
280
See Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
281
Id.
282
See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1093 (10th Cir. 2009).
283
See id. at 1093–94.
284
See id.
285
See id. at 1093 (e.g., .txt, .doc, .docx, and .dot for Microsoft Word; .wpt,
.wpk, and .wpd for WordPerfect; .pdf for Adobe; .xls, .xlsb, and .xltx for Microsoft
Excel; or.jpg and .gif for images).
286
Kerr, supra note 128, at 545.
287
See id.
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police can detect these unreadable files and determine the correct file
extension. The lesson, however, is the same: officers cannot limit their
searches to certain file types. 288
The third common way to conceal incriminating documents is
to hide incriminating files among innocuous files. 289 By burying
incriminating files among dozens or even hundreds of unrelated,
noncriminal files, law enforcement has much more difficulty locating
the types of files authorized for search and seizure by the warrant. 290
Although a warrant must state the types of files or content to be
searched for, “[i]t is unrealistic to expect a warrant to prospectively
restrict the scope of a search by [a specific] directory, filename or
extension.” 291 This does not mean that officers can look at every
single file on a computer. Instead, the officer should “look in the most
obvious places . . . But in the end, there may be no practical substitute
for actually looking in many (perhaps all) folders and sometimes at the
documents contained within those folders.” 292
In sum, it is unrealistic to expect a magistrate to be able to
prospectively limit a search to certain file types or names since law
enforcement personnel rarely know what information they are going to
find on a computer. When an officer begins his search, he should look
in the most obvious places—either by using a keyword search or
manually searching the computer for files whose names indicate that
they are within the scope of the warrant. If this initial inquiry uncovers
nothing, then the officer can broaden his search by cursorily looking at
all files on the computer to determine whether the content is relevant
and within the scope of the warrant.

288

See id.
United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 1999)
(“[C]omputer hackers often intentionally mislabel files, or attempt to bury
incriminating files within innocuously named directories.”).
290
See id.
291
United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1093 (10th Cir. 2009).
292
Id. at 1094.
289
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2. Did the officer open the files cursorily?
Since the content of computer files can be so easily disguised,
an officer executing a warrant must often open each file to determine
whether its falls within the scope of the warrant. 293 Some defendants
have argued that this essentially turns every computer search into a
general search. 294 However, having to cursorily open computer files
can be equated with traditional physical evidence seizures, where
cursorily examining files is acceptable.
The Supreme Court has held that when searching through large
files of business documents, “it is certain that some innocuous
documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine
whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be
seized.” 295 For example, the Fourth Circuit held that officers acted
lawfully when they briefly read a letter found in the defendant’s
apartment that detailed a recipe for making methamphetamine. 296
Since the letters were within plain view, the court held that “some
perusal, generally fairly brief, of the documents was clearly necessary
in order for the police to perceive the relevance of the document to
crime.” 297 After briefly reading the documents, their incriminating
nature became immediately apparent and subject to seizure under the
plain view doctrine. 298
Just like searching through physical documents, an officer
searching through hundreds or thousands of computer files must
cursorily open each document to determine its content.299 If the file’s
criminality becomes immediately apparent after opening it, then the
file may be lawfully seized under the plain view doctrine. 300 For
example, in United States v. Gray, the Northern District of Virginia
293

See United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 521–22 (4th Cir. 2010)
See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1271–72 (10th Cir. 1999).
295
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976).
296
United States v. Crouch, 648 F.2d 932, 933 (4th Cir. 1981).
297
Id. (quoting United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1257 n.8 (2d Cir. 1979)).
298
Id. at 934.
299
See United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 521–22 (4th Cir. 2010).
300
See id. at 522.
294

527

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010

37

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 5, Issue 2

Spring 2010

held that an officer could open computer records to determine the
computer’s content. 301 An FBI agent was executing a search for
evidence of unauthorized government computer intrusions. 302 He
utilized a software program that created a directory of the computer
files, and he followed FBI protocol by opening and looking “briefly at
each of the files contained in the directories.” 303 The agent discovered
child pornography in a folder titled “Tiny Teen.” 304 The court,
however, held that his search of the folder was a lawful continuation
of his original search. 305 The FBI agent testified that he “knew from
his experience that computer hackers often intentionally mislabel files,
or attempt to bury incriminating files within innocuously named
directories.” 306 It was improper to limit computer searches to certain
file names because “the designation or labeling of files on a computer
can easily be manipulated to hide their substance.” 307
This position is supported by practical considerations. If police
could examine only files with certain names or file types, criminals
would have an obvious advantage over law enforcement. This standard
would induce every criminal, knowing that the police’s hands are so
tightly tied behind their backs, to label incriminating computer files
with innocuous names and bury the files among innocent content. This
would be a perverse result because it would make law enforcement
efforts more difficult and would reduce the likelihood that someone
will be arrested for illegal activity.
An analogy of this impracticable standard to physical evidence
would be a rule that precluded police from seizing a bag containing a
powdery white substance if it is labeled “flour” or “talcum powder.” 308
In order to determine the contents, the powdery substance must be
tested. 309 Similarly, a computer file must be cursorily examined in
301

United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 1999).
Id. at 526.
303
Id.
304
Id. at 527.
305
Id. at 530.
306
Id. at 529.
307
United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522 (4th Cir. 2010).
308
Ziff, supra note 64, at 864.
309
Id.
302
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order to determine its content. The principles relating to physical
searches should be extended to digital searches in order to allow police
to conduct a thorough and effective computer search.
3. After uncovering material outside the scope of the warrant, did the
officer stop his search and get a second warrant for the newly
discovered evidence?
Although officers can cursorily open documents on a
computer, what the officer does after discovering incriminating files
outside the scope of the warrant becomes important. Some courts have
held that the officer must stop his search and obtain a second warrant
for the newly discovered incriminating evidence. 310 Indeed, this is the
most prudent course of action an officer can take when he uncovers
evidence outside the scope of the warrant.
For example, in United States v. Burgess, when the officer
discovered child pornography that was outside the scope of the
warrant, he immediately stopped his search and obtained a second
warrant to search for the child pornography. 311 The Tenth Circuit held
that the first image the officer viewed was admissible under the plain
view doctrine. 312 But the officer did not exceed the scope of the
warrant because he immediately stopped his search and did not renew
it until he received a second warrant. 313 The first image established
probable cause for the second warrant, and the images later discovered
under the second warrant were admissible. 314 The court did note that
had the first image had a filename “strongly suggesting pornography,”
the officer could not have legally opened the file since he would have
had reason to know that its content was outside the scope of the
310

See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009); Gray,
78 F. Supp. at 527–28 (E.D. Va. 1999).
311
576 F.3d at 1092; see also Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 527–28 (holding that
child pornography was admissible because the officer obtained a second warrant
after inadvertently discovering child pornography).
312
See Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1092.
313
Id. at 1094–95.
314
See id. at 1084, 1094–95.
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warrant. 315 The officer would have had probable cause, but would
have had to secure a second warrant before proceeding. 316
4. If clear, what were the subjective intentions of the officer?
Courts should consider the subjective intent of the officer when
their intent is clear. For example, the detective in United States v.
Carey admitted to stopping his original search and beginning a second
search for child pornography. 317 The subjective intent of the officer
clearly indicated that his search was outside the scope of the
warrant. 318
However, a subjective intent analysis should be restricted to
situations where the intent of the officer is clear and he admits to
starting a second, unauthorized search. As discussed previously, there
is an incentive for police officers to testify that their search did not go
beyond the scope of the warrant. 319 However, if an officer admits in
court that he intended to go beyond the scope of the warrant, that
evidence is relevant in determining whether the seized evidence
should be suppressed.
CONCLUSION
The traditional principles of Fourth Amendment search and
seizure doctrine—reasonableness, the particularity requirement, and
the plain view doctrine—should continue to be the standard that courts
apply in both physical and digital evidence cases. Established in a precomputer era, these principles should be allowed to gradually evolve
into the realm of digital evidence. Both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
315

Id. at 1095.
Id.
317
172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999); see also United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1010 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that
the federal agent exceeded the scope of the warrant because he intentionally
“peruse[d the file] to see if there was anything above and beyond that which was
authorized for seizure in the initial warrant”).
318
See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273.
319
See id. at 1271.
316
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have departed from this sound precedent prematurely and have crafted
alternative approaches that either go against Supreme Court precedent
or create as many problems as they solve. The Seventh Circuit, in
United States v. Mann, reached the correct conclusion and properly
applied court precedent. The prevalence of computers in American
society and the higher potential for privacy invasions is a concern of
which courts should take note. However, the prudent and correct
approach for future courts is to abide by settled court precedent and
expand the doctrines incrementally as needed.
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